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Abstract
The use of digital dossiers in Courts of Law, although
currently in the phase of study, will be common practice in
the future. This paper introduces the notion of distributed
digital dossiers supported by a multi-agent system architec-
ture, developed in interaction with the Courts of Amsterdam
and Rotterdam. Management of such dossiers is core to the
approach: consistency, completeness, integrity and security
key concepts.
1. Introduction
In today’s society information is inherently distributed
across different physical locations and systems (both human
and automated). More and more information is becoming
available digitally, making it possible for information to be
sought, structured, and processed electronically. This also
holds for Courts of Law. Many sources of information are
consulted during the course of a case. The Courts of Rotter-
dam and Amsterdam are currently experimenting with the
digital dossier during trials. This dossier, prepared by the
Public Prosecutor, is shared by the judge(s) involved, the
public prosecutor, the defense and the clerks1. Each of these
individuals can make his/her own notes and decide whether
and with whom to share his/her notes.
The Public Prosecutor is responsible for the creation and
preparation of the digital dossier. Although currently the
dossier is based on scanned documents, more and more in-
formation (relevant for the dossier) is available electroni-
cally. This paper explores the options of distributed digital
1Defense lawyers are at the moment not included in this pilot study, but
they should be at a later stage.
dossiers, supported by a multi-agent system architecture, to
improve consistency, completeness, integrity and security
of the information in such dossiers. This is also the goal
of the the Agent-based Criminal Court Electronic Support
Systems (ACCESS) project2, initiated by the VU Univer-
sity Amsterdam together with the Courts of Amsterdam and
Rotterdam, and financed by the Dutch Court for Jurisdic-
tion3 and NWO4. The focus of the project is on complete-
ness, consistency, security and reliability of digital dossiers.
In our approach, physically distributed information
sources, such as the Public Prosecution, the Police or the
Prison system remain responsible for the integrity of their
own information content, each monitored by one or more of
their own software agents. The Public Prosecutor, in turn, is
responsible for consistency and completeness of the dossier.
Checks can be done periodically or whenever information
is modified. Security is the topic of Section 2 together with
the domain specific requirements of this application. Sec-
tion 3 sketches how a distributed digital dossier can be im-
plemented. Section 4 proposes the high level functional de-
sign of an agent based system for accessing the distributed
digital dossier and Section 5 discusses the associated se-
curity architecture. Section 6 uses a simplified case study
dealing with juvenile repeat offenders to illustrate some of
the legal challenges of a system used in the environment
of the courts. The paper ends with conclusions and future
work.
2. Security requirements
The two most important requirements for the distributed
digital dossier addressed in this paper are security and re-
2http://www.iids.org/access
3Dutch: Raad voor de Rechtspraak
4the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research
liability. These two requirements mandate more specific
security requirements (1) that hold for all comparable dis-
tributed computer systems, but also (2) requirements that
hold for this specific application, e.g. a judge should only
have access to the cases with which he/she is directly in-
volved. Personal dossiers may not be aggregated.
Nine principals, related directly to relatively standard se-
curity requirements for distributed clinical information sys-
tems [2] can be applied to the the Courts as follows:
1. Access Control: each individual dossier shall be
marked with an access control list naming the people
or groups of people who may read it and append data to
it. The system shall prevent anyone not on the access
control list from accessing the dossier in any way.
2. Dossier creation: a dossier is always created by a pub-
lic prosecutor.
3. Control: separate records in the dossier are the respon-
sibility of individuals that are on the access control list.
This person (possibly acting on behalf of an organiza-
tion) is responsible for the record’s information until
at some later time the control is transferred to another
person on the access control list.
4. Notification: defendants shall be informed of the con-
tent of the dossier as required by law. In some cases a
defendant has the legal right to decide if information is
added to a dossier. Defendants have the right to chal-
lenge the correctness of the information contained in
the dossier during trial.
5. Persistence: no one shall have the ability to delete
(parts of) the dossier, unless this is mandated by the
(Dutch) law because the time for enforcement has
passed (extinguishment).
6. Attribution: all changes to (records of) the dig-
ital dossier shall be marked with the subjects
(users/organizations) identity as well as date and time.
An audit trial must also be kept of all deletions5.
7. Information Flow: information from record A may be
appended to record B if and only if B’s access control
list is contained in A’s.
8. Aggregation control: there shall be an effective mea-
sure to prevent the aggregation of personal information
contained in the digital dossier.
9. Trusted computing base: computer systems that handle
digital dossiers should have a subsystem that enforces
the above principles in an effective way.
5For our purpose attribution and auditability can be regarded as similar
requirements.
In addition, in the specific context of the digital dossier
the following additional requirements hold:
10. Secure transfer: the (physically) distributed organi-
zations shall only exchange information over secure
communication channels that guarantee confidentiality
and integrity of the transferred data.
11. Compartmentalization of information: it shall be pos-
sible for organizations to access only those parts of the
dossier that they are responsible for and/or need access
to.
12. Consistency: the data in the dossier shall be (inter-
nally) consistent.
13. Completeness: each dossier shall be complete when it
is send to the court and lawyers of the defendants.
14. Backups: periodically backups of each dossier shall
be made. These backup copies are secured against
unauthorized access in a similar fashion as the origi-
nal dossiers.
Consistency and completeness are especially challeng-
ing requirements: they must be guaranteed. When an au-
thorized organization, e.g. the Council for Child Defence,
adds a record to a specific digital dossier, the system needs
to check whether the information is consistent with all other
information in the dossier, for example whether e.g. per-
sonal information, such as name, address, age and sex of
the subject, is consistent across records/documents.
Completeness requirements hold for all dossiers includ-
ing generic completeness requirements, and offense specific
completeness requirements. Generic completeness require-
ments specify that certain personal information on the de-
fendant as well as the offense for which the defendant is
charged, and the official report filed by the police, must
be included. In addition, offense specific completeness re-
quirements hold: e.g. a drunken driving charge requires an
alcohol test by an authorized lab. The system should guar-
antee completeness of the dossier before it is transferred to
the Court.
The next sections propose a design for an agent based
support system for the distributed digital dossier that fulfills
the above mentioned requirements.
3. The distributed digital dossier
The nature of the application with physically distributed
sources of information distributed over different organiza-
tions is the reason this paper proposes a distributed digital
dossier. This section describes the implications for the or-
ganizations involved.
Each individual digital dossier is created by the Public
Prosecutor once he/she decides, on the basis of information
available, to prosecute a defendant. A newly created dossier
consists of records and meta data. The meta data contains
information such as the access control list for this dossier,
logging information on who altered or accessed information
at what time and when the last backup of the dossier was
made. The meta data part of the dossier is stored by the the
Public Prosecution.
Individual records are the responsibility of different or-
ganizations. Personal information, for example, is managed
and maintained by the defendant’s local authorities. Infor-
mation on a juvenile’s family situation is provided by the the
Council for Child Defence etc.. Distributing this data and
the responsibility for the data ensures that information in the
digital dossier is kept as up-to-date as possible. Changes in
data are flagged by the relevant organizations and transmit-
ted to the the Public Prosecution for synchronization of the
complete (distributed) dossier.
Thus the basic dossier itself is stored by the Public Pros-
ecution while relevant records are maintained and stored by
the responsible organizations and then synchronized with
the digital dossier by the the Public Prosecution.
When the the Public Prosecution decides that a case is
ready for Court the dossier is ‘frozen’: the dossier is final-
ized and forwarded to the presiding judge and the defen-
dant’s lawyer. From this point on the dossier is no longer
distributed and other organizations are no longer responsi-
ble for ”their” records. Note that as a result a trial is based
on information available at this point in time.
As is currently the case, the the Public Prosecution de-
cides which information is included in the frozen version of
the dossier, and which not, based on his/her judgment of its
relevance. Additional information can, from this moment
on, only be added by one of the parties involved by spe-
cial procedure that ensures that the relevant additions to the
dossier are distributed to the concerned parties (prosecutors,
judges and defense lawyers).
Once a case has been tried, a dossier can be ‘defrosted’,
i.e., made distributed again, re-’frozen’ when needed for a
trial, etc. This process can be repeated numerous times (re-
trials, appeals etc.) until a dossier is finally closed.
Management of this process can be based on one of Two
life cycle models for digital dossiers:
• The naive life cycle model, is the conceptually most
straightforward model. A dossier is ‘frozen’ (static and
centralized) and ‘defrosted’ (dynamic and distributed)
as required. Note that a technical solution for defrost-
ing a dossier is non-trivial, as it requires identification
of the appropriate organization for each record in the
dossier and complete new resynchronization of infor-
mation contained in the dossier’s records. Doing this
automatically is a challenge.
The picture below illustrates the naive model:
A distributed digital dossier is shown on
the far left. This dossier is frozen, resulting
in a static file with the current state of the
data. Next, as indicated by the solid black
arrows copies of this static dossier are dis-
tributed to the Public Prosecution, the Court
and the defendant’s lawyer. If a new trial is
needed, e.g. due to a miss-trial or an appeal,
the dossier is distributed again (defrosted),
as shown on the far right of the picture.
Each organization is again responsible for
”its” records in the dossier.
• The semi-freezing life cycle model, is less drastic.
Freezing entails making a local central copy of the
dossier as in the above case. The difference is that the
distributed version of the dossier still exists. If and
when a dossier is defrosted, a new version is instantly
available (again). This model is technically prefer-
able, the only difficulty that can arise is that during
trial, additional information may have been added to
the dossier (by the Court or the defense). This informa-
tion needs to be distributed to the relevant parties. By
default the Public Prosecution is responsible for this
information.
The semi-freezing model is schematically displayed
below:
As in the naive model, the distributed digi-
tal dossier is shown on the far left. Once the
dossier is frozen and copied (solid arrows),
the dossier remains distributed (indicated
by the dashed arrows). If and when a case
is directed to a new Court, a completely
new dossier can be acquired on the basis of
the information as known to the distributed
organizations responsible for the records.
New information that surfaced during the
trial, however, needs to be incorporated into
the rest of the distributed dossier.
Both models have technical and conceptual advantages.
As the semi-freezing model ensures a maximum of both
control and responsibility for all parties involved this model
is preferred. As such it is used in the remainder of this pa-
per. The next section illustrates how the distributed digital
dossier can be supported by means of a multi-agent system.
The proposed security architecture that fulfills the require-
ments from Section 2 is proposed in Section 5.
4. An agent based design
This section describes the functional design of a multi
agent system for distributed digital dossier support. Note
that no attempt is made to describe the exact type of infor-
mation that is contained in each digital dossier. This in-
formation highly depends on the specific offense/crime in-
volved, e.g. not all digital dossiers will contain a DNA en-
try type. All dossiers, however, do contain entry fields for
information such as the personal information of the defen-
dant.
Distributed multi-agent systems provide a promising
paradigm for large scale distributed autonomous sys-
tems [7]. Agents are pro-active, adapt to a changing world
and can be mobile [16]. The main reasons for using an agent
system is a conceptually clear model for autonomous sys-
tems that supports modularity, security and scalability. Spe-
cific tasks can be implemented by dedicated agents, allow-
ing for a clear separation of concerns and straightforward
integration of new functionality as new agents.
¿From a technical perspective, one or more computer
hosts that are maintained by the same organization together
form a location. A dedicated middleware layer, the agent
platform ensures that all hosts at a location can be viewed as
one logical unit. The middleware ensures that all agents can
uniquely be identified (using a lookup service), that agents
on different locations can communicate with each other and
that, if required, agents can migrate between locations6.
Examples of such agent systems include AgentScape [8],
JADE [3] and SeMoA [10].
In our model all interaction with the digital dossier is
facilitated by means of agents. Only authorized agents can
alter records in a dossier. The dossier is the single point of
entry, providing a means to regulate access control (see the
next section).
6Not all agent systems allow migration of agents.
Each functional organization has its own collection of
hosts (agent location) and an agent platform. This allows
local control and responsibility of data (and access to data)
while at the same time it supports the use of global security
policies that can guarantee a minimal set of (global) security
requirements. The next section elaborates further on this
topic.
5. Security architecture
The following security architecture provides a means to
fulfill the security requirements identified in Section 2.
The semi-open nature of the environment of the Courts
makes access control a particular challenge. Access control
regulations in such systems generally tend to make all data
more difficult to access, including the less sensitive infor-
mation that can be of interest to a large public. This phe-
nomenon is known to as ‘label creep’ in the literature [11].
Our proposed solutions handles this problem by means
of a two-tier access model. On the first level role based ac-
cess control [12] is used as an access control mechanism
for access to the information system that contains the dis-
tributed digital dossier. Each ‘role’, such as a judge, a
lawyer, the Public Prosecution, or a clerk, has certain rights
regarding the dossier. This will depend on specific secu-
rity policies, e.g. a clerk may only add information to the
dossier, not delete or modify anything, while the Public
Prosecution may change existing information in the dossier
and even create new dossiers.
Additionally, the second access level uses access con-
trol lists [6] to limit the access of individuals. Each dossier
contains (in its meta data) information on specific individ-
uals that may change, read, delete or add information to a
dossier. For example, judge A may read a specific dossier
(since its his/her case), while judge B may not. Thus in or-
der to change records in the digital dossier (via an agent)
the user also has to be on the access control list of a specific
dossier.
The distinction between roles and individuals is crucial
in a dynamic environment (such as is the case associated
with the digital dossier). Security policies based on roles
can be regarded as static (or at least ‘long lived’) and are
typically globally valid (at all possible locations), while
individual access control lists are typically dynamic (or
‘short lived’). Individual policies typically only apply per
dossier, or even shorter if a dossier is handed over to an-
other clerk/prosecutor/judge etc. The combination of static
and dynamic access control rules should also limit the ‘label
creep’ phenomena.
In addition, each user also has a public/private key pair
and a corresponding digital certificate, as specified in the
X509 standard [1]. The certificates are organized in a stan-
dard PKI infrastructure [6] and are used for signatures on
individual records, to enforce integrity of a digital dossier
as a whole.
Other security requirements are handled by the agent
platform [15]: integrity of agents and their data, secure
communication (and possibly migration) between platform
locations (e.g. Public Prosecution Services and the Council
for Child Defence) etc. All other functionality, including
security, are implemented by individual agents. These in-
clude, amongst others, the following:
• Completeness: A dedicated agent checks the com-
pleteness of each dossier. A dossier should always
include the required minimal information such as per-
sonal information, criminal charge and warrants. Ad-
ditional completeness checks are performed on a per
case basis. For example, a dossier concerning a drunk
driving case should include a rapport that details the
factual information of the alcohol blood level at the
time of the offense.
• Consistency: Consistency is checked whenever infor-
mation from an outside source (such as from the Coun-
cil for Child Defence) is entered in the digital dossier.
A dedicated consistency agent (per dossier) checks if
all personal data from the outside source matches the
data in the digital dossier. If this is not the case a (hu-
man) agent needs to decide how to act further. The
consistency agent will mark such an event in the meta
data of the digital dossier. It is also possible for the
agent to make an ‘educated guess’ related to (simple)
consistency issues. This can automate parts of resolv-
ing consistency problems. Though notice that (exter-
nal) consistency cannot be guaranteed automatically,
since the agent needs to confirm the reliability of the
information it has with outside sources, something that
is usually not possible.
• Persistence: Dedicated agents guard the life of data
entries in the digital dossier. For example, information
obtained from the Council for Child Defence concern-
ing juvenile suspects may, by law, only be kept for a
maximum period of five years and should also be de-
stroyed when the subject turns 18.
• Attribution: A logging agent is responsible for logging
all information per dossier (who changed what, when,
etc.). This information is safely stored (preferably of-
fline and encrypted) and needs to be integrity preserv-
ing (using signatures).
• Backups: Similarly, a special purpose backup agent
can be deployed to facilitate secure backups of the dig-
ital dossier. This could be combined with the logging
agent, since these agents share a lot of functionality.
This system is inherently modular, new functionality can
be added by new agents that can be used whenever required.
For example, an agent that can advise a judge about the
strictness of a verdict in similar cases can be integrated in
the agent system without any difficulty.
6. Legal issues
The example of juvenile repeat offenders is used in this
paper to illustrate the types of information included in a dis-
tributed digital dossier and their sources, the focus is on
the information exchange between the Public Prosecution
and the Council for Child Defence. This scenario has been
chosen because repeat offenders and especially juvenile of-
fenders represent an interesting and socially important sub-
ject. If it is possible to reduce the number of juvenile repeat
offenders, identify responsible parties in an earlier phase
and/or stream-line the trial chain associated with juvenile
repeat offenders in any way then the gains can be huge.
A fictive scenario is presented to illustrate a number of
legal issues in relation to the use of agent technology in a
criminal trial, in a Dutch legal setting7. In this scenario an
agent of the Public Prosecution requests (an agent of) the
Council for Child Defence to add information regarding a
child’s (a juvenile suspect) home environment to the digital
dossier. If successful, the Council for Child Defence’s agent
adds the newly acquired information regarding the child’s
home environment to the digital dossier. A signature, us-
ing the Council for Child Defence’s private key, over the
newly created record is also included in the dossier. If the
the Council for Child Defence does not wish to provide this
information the Council for Child Defence’s agent adds a
note that the information was requested but not released.
The reason why the information was not released is pro-
vided, e.g. because the Council for Child Defence did not
have this information or was unwilling to provide the infor-
mation for a specific reason, etc. Note that security require-
ments such as persistence and attribution are of importance.
More precisely, the scenario requires an agent of the Pub-
lic Prosecution to send a message to the agent of the Coun-
cil for Child Defence requesting information regarding the
child’s home environment of a juvenile defendant. All per-
sonal data of the defendant is contained in the message to
minimize the risk that the wrong information is added to the
digital dossier of the defendant’s case. At the Council for
Child Defence an agent checks if there is a file of the defen-
dant. If this is indeed the case then the relevant information
(concerning the child’s home environment) of the defendant
is sent back to the the Public Prosecution and added to the
7Note that in this paper all legal and procedural details are interpreted
in the context of Dutch law. For most situations sketched it should be clear
how the situation can be modified for other legal domains. Unlike in most
countries the Dutch legal system does not know jury trial.
defendant’s digital dossier. If the information cannot be re-
leased this is reported back to the agent of the Public Pros-
ecution along with the reason. This negative answer is also
stored in the digital dossier.
From a legal perspective it is important for the Public
Prosecution and the Council for Child Defence to know
to whom an agent belongs, as it acts on behalf of this
person/organization [5]. Identification is also important
when dealing with liability and compliance with agree-
ments. From a legal perspective it is not possible to hold
software agents themselves responsible for any actions. The
owner/user is always responsible [13]: there must be a link
between the agent and its provider or user (attribution).
Taking into account the responsibility of the Public Pros-
ecution and the Council for Child Defence for their agents
and the aim and execution of the tasks of the Council for
Child Defence, and the reports of the Council for Child
Defence, the agent of the Public Prosecution can request
reports from the agent of the Council for Child Defence,
that is, reports concerning advices, petitions and counsel-
ing in criminal cases [14]. Before adding personal data to a
digital dossier, the Council for Child Defence needs to jus-
tify such a decision. Only if the client (the defendant) of
the Council for Child Defence gives explicit permission to
exchange his/her own personal data, can (the agent of) the
Council for Child Defence supply the personal data to the
agent of the Public Prosecution (notification). The Counsel
for Child Defense may also supply information to the agent
of the Public Prosecution when there is a legal duty to do
so or when supplying information is necessary for a good
execution of the Public Prosecution’s tasks. As a guideline,
Dutch law forbids the exchange of certain personal data,
unless there is a legal valid reason. In all cases in which
the Council for Child Defence is legally allowed to release
personal data for the digital dossier, it needs to inform that
person of its action. The Public Prosecution Service is ex-
pected to carefully handle the received reports to guarantee
the privacy of the client of the Council for Child Defence.
The Counsel for Child Defense must add a record to the
(local) dossier of their client that states, when and to whom
what data was supplied.
The Public Prosecution Service can only give informa-
tion to the Council for Child Defence when necessary for a
good execution of the tasks of the Public Prosecution and
insofar a weighty public interest is involved. This last cri-
terion is for protection of others [4]. Furthermore, giving
information to the Council for Child Defence must serve
a purpose as stated in legislation. In the case of possible
child abuse or other domestic violence in which children
are victims, the purpose may be preventing criminal acts or
supporting victims. In that case information can be given
to the Council for Child Defence. For the preparation of
dossiers the Minister of Justice may give copies of reports
in personal dossiers to the director of the Council for Child
Defence.
This small scenario illustrates that provided with a clear
security architecture digital dossiers and agent technology
can be used to fulfill legal requirements on information ex-
change and management. More research will give a more
complete overview of legal requirements, also for other
cases.
7. Conclusions
A distributed digital dossier in combination with a multi-
agent system that is used to access and secure the dossier
can provide major benefits for an information management
system in the legal environment, specifically the Courts.
The main requirements for such a system are consis-
tency, completeness, reliability and security in the form of
access control, confidentiality and integrity. The proposed
system for the distributed digital dossier in the Court of Law
adheres to all these requirements.
Other requirements, such as scalability and performance,
have not been studied. Though state of the art hardware can
usually fulfill such requirements, e.g. if a location does not
handle requests of users (and agents) fast enough, additional
hosts can be added to an agent platform location and an
optic fiber-tube connection between the Public Prosecution
and the Council for Child Defence can help minimize slow
network connections.
8. Future Work
The agent based security architecture presented in this
paper is only the starting point for an information manage-
ment system for a Court of Law. Numerous issues remain.
Our current research focuses on handling consistency and
completeness of digital dossiers automatically. The first re-
sults, employing AI techniques, look promising, but still re-
quire additional effort. On the legal side, the Dutch situation
needs to be compared to the situation in other countries and
legal systems.
A first prototype of the system proposed in this pa-
per is currently under development. The agent platform
Agentscape [8] is being used to realize this system.
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